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I Introduction
In our everyday life we consume a number of goods that all bring us utility. For most of
them, that is all. For some, todays consumption can also have some e¤ects on tomorrows
health. For example, smoking leads to shorter lives or excess sugar to diabetes. To the
extent that we impose costs on ourselves, there is no need for government action except
if, out of ignorance or myopia, we do not take into account the delayed damage done to
our health.1 If this is the case, then there is a paternalisticmandate for public action,
assuming that the government has a correct perception of the health damage generated
by our sinful consumption.
Optimal sin taxes have been studied by ODonoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006). They
model an economy where individuals have hyperbolic preferences and di¤er in both their
taste for the sin good and in their degree of time-inconsistency. They show how (het-
erogeneity in) time inconsistency a¤ects the optimal (Ramsey) consumption tax policy.
Their main insight is that, although taxes create consumption distortion for fully self-
controlled people, such distortions are second-order relative to the benets from reducing
over-consumption by people with self-control problems(ODonoghue and Rabin, 2006,
p. 1827). Gruber and Koszegi (2001) study a Pigouvian tax used to counteract over-
consumption due to self-control problems, and apply their model to the determination of
optimal cigarette taxes. Gruber and Koszegi (2004) also study cigarette taxation with
self-control problems, but their focus is the tax incidence for di¤erent income groups
rather than optimal taxes.
ODonoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) are representative of the literature studying
present-biased preferences (such as Laibson (1997)) in two respects. First, they assume
1 We are not concerned here by two important issues: addiction and externalities associated with sinful
activities.
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that all biased individuals disapprove or regret their past consumption decisions and,
second, there is nothing that agents can do to mitigate the current impact of past con-
sumption decisions. Our paper lifts these two assumptions and studies their consequences
on optimal sin taxes.
We model a two-period setting where individuals consume a sin good, with positive
immediate gratication but negative impact on second period health status. In the second
stage, individuals may invest in health care services that have a positive impact on their
health status. Individuals di¤er in income and in their awareness of the link between sin
good consumption and health care on the one hand, and health status on the other hand.
We contrast two possibilities. In the rst one, individuals in their second period
realize the mistake they committed previously. They regret their past high sin good
consumption, and invest in health care understanding its correct impact on their health
and utility. In other words, individuals su¤er from myopia in the rst period, but use
their true or correct preferences later on when they choose health expenditures. They
thus exhibit dual selves, using a term coined in the behavioral economics literature.
A second case, referred to as persistent error, occurs when all decisions, including the
determination of health expenditures, are made according to the mistaken preferences.
In other words, when individuals realize their error (in the middle of the second period)
it is too late to correct for it.
We use the concept of sinful consumption in a narrower sense than other authors. We
are not interested by externalities such as those related to passive smoking. We are only
concerned by the damage the sinful consumption exerts on the consumers own health.
Sinful consumption is part of the lifestyles regarded as risk factors, the so-called Holy
Four, namely tobacco smoking, drinking of alcoholic beverage, eating an unhealthy diet
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(fat, salt, sweets) and lack of physical activity.2
In our setting, sin goods have the following features: they have detrimental e¤ects
on health, their consumers do not fully anticipate these e¤ects, they bring regret with
some lag and they can be partially o¤set by costly treatment. The issue of regret is
documented by a number of recent surveys. For example, Fong et al. (2004) show on
the basis of telephone surveys in Canada, the US, the UK and Australia that about 90%
of smokers agree with the statement: If you had to do it again, you would not have
started smoking. Finally there is the issue of ex post compensatory treatment. In some
instances there exists no treatment, or there is no choice as in the case of emphysema
that requires oxygen therapy. In many other instances, however, there are treatments
that can partially alleviate the problems brought about by one of the Holy Four.
Note that the formal structure of our model can be applied to account for circum-
stances that go beyond sinful consumption. It can, for example, apply to situations where
habit leads to unforeseen consequences. For instance, people can face needs for which
they are not prepared and which can force them to work longer than expected or even to
unretire.3
Which preferences should the social planner use when assessing optimal taxes/subsidies
on sin good consumption and health care expenditures? The recent literature on pater-
nalism has studied the impact of behavioral considerations on the social objective. Thaler
and Sunstein (2003) make a strong case for libertarian paternalism, which applies when
no coercion is involved, such as when the planner chooses the default option (for exam-
ple, automatic enrollment in 401(k) employee savings plans in the US). Other papers
2 See Harris (1999). There may be other risk factors but there is less research into their prevalence or
into their importance for the burden of disease.
3 See Cremer et al. (2008).
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go further and envision the possibility of coercing individuals by taxing certain goods
or even prohibiting their consumption. The literature has focused upon the case where
people di¤er in their degree of non-rationality. These contributions advocate the use by
the planner of cautious(ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)) or asymmetric(Camerer et
al. (2003)) paternalism, which trades-o¤ the benets of paternalistic interventions for
people making mistakes against the costs for fully rational individuals. This literature
shows that this kind of paternalism usually leads to some intervention, because deviations
from laissez-faire impose second-order costs on rational individuals, but imply rst-order
gains for non-rational persons. Moreover, it is shown (ODonoghue and Rabin (2003,
2006)) that even a small probability (or proportion) of people making mistakes can have
dramatic e¤ects for optimal policy.
We depart from this literature in two ways. First, in addition to studying the dual
self setting, we consider a paternalistic objective where individuals are adamant in their
mistakes i.e., where they either never realize (for instance because of ignorance or cog-
nitive dissonance) or realize too late that they base their decisions on wrong premises.4
Second, rather than mixing rational and non-rational individuals, we contrast the results
obtained when all individuals are repentant in the second period or when none is. Obvi-
ously, paternalism is easier to defend when individuals have dual selves. Similarly, it does
not appear to be problematic in the case of persistenterrors if individuals eventually
realize they made a mistake (albeit too late to take any corrective measures). When
mistakes are truly persistent and individuals never realize their mistakes we return to an
4 Aronsson and Thunström (2008) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2009) also analyze settings where individ-
uals consume a sinful good and can invest in health capital. Their analysis di¤ers from ours in several
ways. Both papers introduce myopia or ignorance in a di¤erent way than we do and which does not allow
for the introduction of the distinction of persistent errors and dual self. Additionally, the rst paper
does not consider the issue of the complementarity/subsitutability of sin good consumption and health
expenditure on health stock and they only consider rst best settings. The second paper introduces
non-linear taxation instead of linear taxation.
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analysis similar to the older literature on merit goods(Musgrave (1959), more recently
Besley (1988)), where we add that the reason for the di¤erence between the planners and
the individualspreferences resides in the (unrecognized) mistakes made by individuals.
To keep the analysis tractable, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First,
we assume that individuals live two periods. Consequently, we cannot have hyperbolic
preferences which require a three period specication. However, their essential feature,
namely the regrets for yielding to the short term concerns, is represented in our setting.5
Second, we study linear tax instruments. Non-linear instruments are clearly more gen-
eral but at the same time they constrain the analysis to focus on a limited number of
individuals.6
We obtain the following main results. We show that the rst-best outcome can be
decentralized with individualized linear taxes and subsidies in the two scenarios (persis-
tent error and dual self). In the rst one, it is necessary to tax the sin good consumption
while subsidizing health care expenditures. There is no need to inuence saving. The
second scenario is more complex, because the social planner faces a problem with chang-
ing preferences. The planner has to intervene in the rst period by taxing the sin good
while subsidizing savings. There is no need to inuence health care expenditures, which
are optimally chosen provided that rst period choices are optimal. Comparing the sin
tax in the two scenarios, we obtain that it is smaller in the dual self case if and only
if the marginal e¤ect of health care on health status increases with sin good consump-
tion. We also show that under this same condition the possibility of compensating health
expenditure makes the sin tax smaller in the dual-self case setting.
5 Additionally in our setting the distinction between sophisticated and non sophisticated individuals
is irrelevant as we do not have any commitment device. For example, in political economy models,
sophisticated individuals can constrain their short term self by their vote (see Cremer et al., 2007 and
Haavio and Kotakorpi, 2009).
6 See Cremer et al. (2009) and Blomquist and Micheletto (2006).
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We then turn to the second best setting where the planner observes neither income,
preferences nor savings and uses uniform lump sum transfer, and taxes/subsidies on the
sin good and on health expenditure. In the single self case, optimal linear sin taxes and
health expenditure subsidies depend upon two terms: a (classical) covariance term reect-
ing distributive considerations and a Pigouvian term that reects the internalities
an individual imposes on himself. In the dual self setting the optimal tax formulas also
contain a third term, which is linked to the inability to control savings. This additional
term would call for higher tax on sin good/subsidy on health care provided that this
tax/subsidy encourages savings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, the model, the rst-
best solution and the decentralization conditions are presented for the two specications.
Then in section III we turn to the second-best problem when individuals persist in their
ignorance. In section IV, we study the alternative second-best problem, that is when
individuals realize having made a mistake. A nal section concludes.
II First-best and decentralization
Model
We consider a society consisting of I types of individuals indexed by subscript i. Each
type of individual is characterized by a wealth endowment wi and subjective and objective
health parameters i and i. The proportion of type i individuals in the population is
given by ni (
PI
i=1 ni = 1). Each individuals life spans two periods. In the rst one, he
consumes a numeraire good ci and a sin good xi. He also saves si for future expenses.
In the second period, he consumes an amount di of the numeraire and he invests ei
in health improvement. In this second period, he enjoys a quality of health ih (xi; ei),
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on which xi has a negative e¤ect and ei a positive e¤ect. For reasons of ignorance or
myopia, the individual has a perception of this function that underestimates the impact
of both arguments. In other words, he perceives a health function equal to ih (xi; ei)
with i < i: We assume for the moment that individuals underestimate the function
h(:) in both periods (persistent error).
His two-period utility function can be written as:
Ui = u (ci) + ' (xi) + u (di) + ih (xi; ei) ; (1)
with budget constraints:
wi = (1 + ) si + (1 + )xi + ci   ai;
di = si   (1 + ) ei;
where u and ' are strictly concave functions,  ; ;  are tax rates and ai is a lump sum
transfer. For simplicity, we assume a zero time discount rate and a zero rate of interest.
Here the myopia parameter concerns the health function. An alternative specication
could be h (ixi; ei), in which case myopia only concerns the sin good and not health
care. This would not change the qualitative nature of our results. A third approach,
often used in papers on social security and saving, is to assume that myopia concerns the
whole second period, namely the utility of health but also the utility for second period
consumption. In that case, the utility function would be given by
u (ci) + ' (xi) + i [u (di) + h (xi; ei)] :
First-best
We assume that the government is paternalistic utilitarian. In other words, its objective
consists of the sum of utilities (1) in which i replaces i. As a benchmark, we derive
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the rst-best (FB) conditions by maximizing the following Lagrangian expression
L1 =
IX
i=1
ni [u (ci) + ' (xi) + u (di) + ih (xi; ei)   (ci + xi + di + ei   wi)] ;
where  is the multiplier associated with the resource constraints. The FOCs yield:
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) = '0 (xi) + ihx (xi; ei) = ihe (xi; ei) = ; (2)
with hx < 0 and he > 0: Denote the rst-best solution by ci ; x

i ; d

i and e

i . We can also
dene si = d

i + e

i , the (implicit) individual savings at the rst-best solution.
The utilitarian planner equalizes marginal utility of consuming the numeraire good in
both periods. Since preferences for this good are the same for all individuals, this calls
for ci and d

i to be equal and the same for all. Marginal utility for numeraire and sin
goods are also equalized, with the latter composed of the immediate marginal gratication
and of the (true) delayed marginal impact on health. Finally, the planner also equalizes
second period marginal utility from consuming the numeraire good and from consuming
health care. If the marginal impact of sin good consumption on health is the same for all
individuals (i = ), then x

i and e

i are also identical for all.
We now contrast the rst-best solution with the laissez-faire allocation obtained when
individuals maximize their own utility. We show that the rst-best allocation can be
decentralized with individualized (redistributive) lump sum taxes and Pigouvian taxes
or subsidies. We have to distinguish two settings: persisting errors on the one hand, and
dual self on the other hand.
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Decentralization with persisting errors
With persisting errors there is just one optimization problem at the start of the rst
period. It amounts to maximizing:
Ui = u (wi   (1 + ) si   (1 + )xi + ai)
+' (xi) + ih (xi; ei) + u (si   (1 + ) ei) :
which yields the following FOCs
  (1 + )u0 (ci)  u0 (di) = 0 (3)
  (1 + )u0(ci) + '0 (xi) + ihx (xi; ei) = 0 (4)
  (1 + )u(di) + ihe (xi; ei) = 0: (5)
In the laissez-faire (LF),  =  =  = ai = 0 and we have
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) = '0 (xi) + ihx (xi; ei) = ihe (xi; ei) :
Marginal utility of consuming the numeraire and the sin goods are also equalized (though
they di¤er across agents if there is heterogeneity in i), but not at the correct level since
individuals make a mistake when assessing the impact of both sin good and health care
consumption on their second period utility (health status).
To decentralize the rst-best optimum, we need individualized redistributive lump
sum taxes ai and individualized corrective taxes or subsidies on the sin good and health
expenditure. Combining (2) with (3)(5) yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In the case of persistent errors, it is possible to decentralize the rst-best
allocation by using individualized lump sum taxes together with a tax on sin good and a
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subsidy on compensatory health given by
i =
(i   i)hx (xi ; ei )
u0(ci)
> 0; (6)
i =
(i   i)
i
< 0: (7)
No tax or subsidy on savings is needed and we have  = 0.
The tax on sin good consumption forces the individual to internalize the full impact
of his sin good consumption on his health. It is proportional to the share (given by
the di¤erence between i and i) of the marginal impact of sin good on health that
he does not spontaneously internalize. It is also necessary to subsidize health care, since
individuals underestimate its impact on health. Intuitively, the subsidy rate is equal to the
percentage of underestimation by the individual (i i)=i. There is no need to inuence
saving, since individuals do not exhibit time-inconsistent preferences. The simplicity
of formula (7) is due to the specication adopted: additive utilities and multiplicative
myopia parameter.
The taxes, i, and subsidies, i, are individualized as long as the parameter  or 
varies across individuals. Naturally, with i =  and i = , taxes would be identical for
all.
Decentralization with dual self
In the previous subsection we have assumed that individuals stick to their beliefs in the
second period when they choose e. Let us now make the reasonable assumption that
in the second period they realize that they have made a mistake out of ignorance or
myopia and take their decision concerning health care using their correct preferences. In
behavioral economics, one then speaks of dual self.
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When the reasonableself prevails in the second period, the choice of ei is determined
by the equality
(1 + )u0 (si   (1 + )ei) = ihe (xi; ei) : (8)
However, this level of e is not the one that the individual envisioned when he chose his
sin good consumption and saving in the rst period. The amount of health care that the
individual originally planned to buy, denoted by ePi , is given by
(1 + )u0(si   (1 + )ePi ) = ihe(xi; ePi ): (9)
The levels of si and xi then satisfy the following rst-order conditions:
  (1 +  i)u0(ci) + u0(si   ePi ) = 0; (10)
  (1 + i)u0(ci) + '0 (xi) + ihx
 
xi; e
P
i

= 0: (11)
Is it possible to decentralize the rst-best optimum in these conditions with our linear
instruments that are chosen in the rst period? Combining (2) with equations (8)(11)
shows that this is possible using  i and i plus ai. With these instruments, and denoting
optimal values with a , one obtains xi and s

i , which then imply e

i . Dening e
P
i as
the planned level of ei when the tax instruments are set to decentralize the rst-best,
we obtain the levels of the tax and subsidy that decentralize the rst-best in this case.
These levels are shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 In the case of dual self, it is possible to decentralize the rst-best allocation
by using individualized lump sum taxes together with a subsidy on savings and a tax on
the sin good given by
 i =
u0(si   ePi )  u0(ci )
u0(ci )
; (12)
i =
ihx
 
xi ; e
P
i
  ihx (xi ; ei )
u0(ci )
: (13)
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No tax or subsidy on health expenditures is needed and we have  = 0.
Equation (8) shows that the individual will take the optimal health care decision in
the second stage, provided that he chose the optimal values of xi and si in the rst stage.
Inuencing the health care decision is then unnecessary, provided that tax instruments
on saving and sin good consumption decentralize these two optimal choices. The sin
tax is proportional to the mistake made by the individual. This mistake comes from
two sources: under-estimation of the impact of sin good on health (since i < i) and
misplanning of the future amount of health care consumed (ePi as opposed to ei). Since
individuals misplan their future health care need, it is also necessary to inuence their
saving decision, as shown by (12).7
Comparison of sin taxes in the two specications
It is interesting to compare the sin taxes obtained under the two specications. To make
the comparison easier, we assume that i =  > 0 and i =  > . Note that, under
this assumption, the use of a personalized lump sum transfer will make all individuals
demand the same amounts of all goods (ci = c
, xi = x
, ei = e
, ePi = e
P). We thus
have (with S for single self and D for dual self):
S =
(  )hx (x; e)
u0 (c)
;
D =
(  )hx (x; e) + 

hx
 
x; eP
  hx (x; e)
u0 (c)
: (14)
In the two cases, the sin tax is proportional to the error made in the rst stage when
7 Assuming i =  and i = , we obtain  i =  and i = : In words, ai makes everyone identical and
the Pigouvian tax and subsidy rates are identical. To illustrate this point, assume a single individual
with  = 0 <  = 1: We then have ePi = 0 so that the implementing tax rates or subsidy are
 =
u0 (s)
u0 (c)
  1 < 0 and  =  hx (x
; e)
u0 (c)
> 0:
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evaluating the damage of sin good consumption on health, measured at the optimal sin
good and health care consumptions. An additional term is present in the dual self case,
which is proportional to the second mistake made by the individual in that case. Since
this individual misestimates how much health care he will buy at the optimum, he is also
mistaken in his assessment of the marginal damage done by the optimal amount of sin
good consumption, as measured by the function h(x; e). The sign of this impact depends
on the cross-derivative of this function. Assume for instance that it is positive. Since the
individual under-estimates how much health care he will buy, he then over-estimates how
bad the marginal impact of sin good will be8 (as measured by the function h(:)). This calls
for decreasing the tax on the sin good, compared to a single selfindividual. Assuming
that hxe has everywhere the same sign, we then obtain the following proposition
Proposition 1 In the rst-best, if i =  > 0 then
S S D () hxe S 0.
Proposition 1 says that the sin tax is higher (lower) in the case of dual self than in
the case of persistent error if the marginal productivity of health expenditures decreases
(increases) with the consumption of the sin good. Consequently the comparison depends
on the sign of the cross derivative. A positive sign means that the marginal e¤ectiveness
(productivity) of health care expenditures increases with the consumption of the sin
good; with a negative sign, health care expenditures are less e¤ective for higher sin good
consumption levels. The sign of this cross derivative depends upon the kind of sin good
under consideration. For instance, it seems reasonable to assume that it is positive if
the sin good is sugar: the more you eat, the more medications designed to treat diabetes
may be helpful to you. With this assumption the sin tax is smaller when the individual
8 Recall that hx(:) < 0.
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acknowledges his mistake in the second period of his life. Given the increased productivity
of health care, in the dual case the individual easily corrects for his earlier excess while
the individual in the persistent errors case is unable or unwilling to do so. The opposite
assumption can be made for smoking: heavy smokers increase their probability of getting
lung cancer, for which there is up to now no e¢ cient cure in the majority of cases. Put
bluntly, there is not much utility that you can get from consuming health care if you end
up with lung cancer following heavy smoking.
So far we have contrasted the rst-best policies with dual self on the one hand and
persistent error on the other hand. However, it is also interesting to study the impact
of the availability of a compensatory treatment. To do this, we compare the policy with
dual self when a compensatory treatment exists and when it does not; let Dnc represent
the optimal sin tax when there is no compensatory treatment in the dual self case. To
make this comparison we have to set the value of e to get a meaningful counterfactual.
The most natural approach is to adopt the optimal value of e, that is e such as dened
in the rst-best section, and to assume that it is exogenous. In that case, it is plain
that the optimal sin tax is exactly the same as the one with persistent error, specied by
equation (6), i.e.
Dnc =
(  )hx (x; e)
u0(c)
: (15)
This tax rate, by its very denition, induces the individual to choose the optimal level of
the sin good for given health expenditures, e. Recall that in the case of persistent error,
the planned and e¤ective levels of e are equal and no correction for the misplanning of
e is needed in the rule for the sin tax. When there is no compensatory treatment, such
a correction is of course not needed either. In other words, in the case of persistent
ignorance there is no willingness to correct for the sin good induced health deterioration;
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when there is no compensatory treatment there is no room for correction. This leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the case of dual self, if i =  > 0 then
Dnc S D () hxe S 0.
Proposition 2 says that the possibility of compensating for the sinful consumption
leads to a higher (lower) rst-best sin tax (compared to a setting where such a com-
pensation is not available) if the marginal productivity of health expenditures decreases
(increases) with the consumption of the sin good.
III Second-best in the case of persistent errors
We now turn to the second-best setting with linear tax instruments and a uniform lump
sum transfer. It is the combination of these two assumptions which explains the move to a
second best setting. We assume in the remaining of this paper that i =  > i: In other
words, the objective e¤ect of both e and x on health is the same for all, but individuals
di¤er in their degree of myopia (as well as in income). We also assume that taxes/subsidies
on saving are not available anymore (either because saving is not observable, or because
elements not modeled, like international mobility of capital, prevent saving from being
taxed or subsidized).9 This allows us to concentrate on the two instruments which are
the most relevant from the perspective of this paper.
We rst consider the case where the individuals never acknowledge that the true health
parameter is  (or do so after e is determined). In that case, restricting the instruments
9 Introducing this extra instrument would complicate the expressions considerably without a¤ecting the
results in a signicant way. In particular, even with the three tax instruments (but without non uniform
lump-sum transfers) the rst best cannot be implemented except in very special cases; see below for
additional discussion.
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to linear taxes and uniform lump sum transfer we write the new Lagrangian as
L2 =
IX
i=1
ni [u(wi   si   xi (1 + ) + a) + ' (xi) + u (si   (1 + ) ei)
+h (xi; ei)   (a  xi   ei)] ;
where si, xi and ei are functions of a,  and  and are obtained from the following optimal
conditions for individual choices:
  u0 (ci) + u0 (di) = 0; (16)
  u0 (ci) (1 + ) + '0 (xi) + ihx (xi; ei) = 0; (17)
  u0 (di) (1 + ) + ihe (xi; ei) = 0: (18)
The rst-order conditions for the maximization of L2 are provided in Appendix A. In
compensated terms, these expressions can be written as:10
@ ~L2
@
=  cov (u0 (ci) ; xi) +
IX
i=1
ni (   i)Hi + 
IX
i=1
ni


@~xi
@
+ 
@~ei
@

= 0; (19)
@ ~L2
@
=  cov (u0 (ci) ; ei) +
IX
i=1
ni (   i)Hi   
IX
i=1
ni


@~xi
@
+ 
@~ei
@

= 0; (20)
where
Hi = hx(xi; ei)
@~xi
@
+ he(xi; ei)
@~ei
@
and Hi = hx(xi; ei)
@~xi
@
+ he(xi; ei)
@~ei
@
:
It is important to note that we here use the concept of average compensation and not
that of the standard Slutsky term. Using a tilde (~) for our compensation term and a
10 Dening
@ ~L2
@
=
@L2
@
+
@L2
@a
xi and
@ ~L2
@
=
@L2
@
+
@L2
@a
ei
where xi and ei are the average values of xi and ei, respectively. Additionally, recall that for any two
variables zi and vi dened for our population
cov (zi; vi) =
IX
i=1
nizivi   zi vi:
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hat (^) for the standard Slutsky term, we have
@~xi
@
=
@xi
@
+
@xi
@a
ei =
@x^i
@
+
@xi
@a
(ei   ei) ;
@~xi
@
=
@x^i
@
+
@xi
@a
(xi   xi) .
Our approach is simple, but the signs of the compensated terms have to be interpreted
with caution. For example, we know that @x^i=@ < 0, but if xi is much smaller than the
average, xi, @~xi=@ could be positive.
In interpreting the above FOCs, we assume that these own compensated derivatives
are negative.11 Observe that with identical individuals the rst-best optimum is obtained
with just  and . Equations (19) and (20) jointly dene the values of  and . To obtain
the tax formulas that dene each of these taxes/subsidies we can use Cramers rule to
solve for  and  to obtain
 =
1
Dpe
"
cov (u0 (ci) ; xi)
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
  cov (u0 (ci) ; ei)
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
 
IX
i=1
ni (   i)Hi
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
+
IX
i=1
ni (   i)Hi
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
#
;
 =
1
Dpe
"
cov (u0 (ci) ; ei)
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
  cov (u0 (ci) ; xi)
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
 
IX
i=1
ni (   i)Hi
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
+
IX
i=1
ni (   i)Hi
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
#
;
where
Dpe = 
"
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
 
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
#
:
If we assume that the cross derivatives are negligible, namely that @~x=@ ! 0 and
@~e=@ ! 0, we obtain:
 =
PI
i=1 ni (   i)hx (xi; ei) (@~xi=@)  cov (u0 (ci) ; xi)
 PIi=1 ni (@~xi=@) ; (21)
 =
PI
i=1 ni (   i)he (xi; ei) (@~ei=@)  cov (u0 (ci) ; ei)
 PIi=1 ni (@~ei=@) : (22)
11 That is (@~xi=@) < 0 and (@~ei=@) < 0.
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The expressions for the optimal levels of the sin tax and the health subsidy include
two terms: a Pigouvian term that corrects for the degree of myopia and an optimal tax
term that measures the redistributive impact of the sin tax or the health subsidy. The
rst term of the numerator of (21) and (22) is the Pigouvian term found in (6) and (7)
summed over all individuals with weights equal to the e¤ect of the tax on individual
demands of either xi or ei. With both derivatives of demand functions negative, this
term calls for a tax on sin good and a subsidy on health care.
The second term of the numerator of (21) and (22) reects redistributive consid-
erations. It depends on the concavity of u, the initial inequality of earnings and the
correlation between i and wi: With identical individuals, this term disappears and (21)
and (22) reduce to (6) and (7).12 With di¤erent individuals and no correlation between
i and wi, the covariance will be negative in both equations, since richer people consume
more of all goods (xi, ci and ei) than poorer people with the same degree of myopia.
This tends to increase the tax on the sin good and decrease the subsidy on health care,
compared to the case with identical individuals. A positive correlation (between i and
wi) tends to reduce the consumption of xi of the high wage individuals. The sin good
consumption now increases less fast with income and it may even decrease (when the my-
opia e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect).13 Consequently, the cov(u0 (ci) ; xi) will increase
and may even become positive which leads to a smaller sin tax than with zero correlation.
Intuitively, the redistributive benets of sin taxes are mitigated or even reversed when
12 We have a rst-best solution with  = u0(ci).
13 There are many studies that look at the correlation between wealth and other behaviors or char-
acteristics such as smoking or obesity. They show that there is a strong negative correlation between
this characteristics and wealth (e.g. Stunkard and Sorensen, 1993). This literature provides admittedly
indirect support for a positive correlation between i and wi. The negative correlation between obesity
or smoking and wealth can also be explained by factors other than myopia; for example for the case of
obesity a negative correlation with wealth can also follow from di¤erences in food prices according to fat
content.
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the rich are less myopic. Either way, the absolute value of the covariance will tend to be
larger the more concave is u and the more unequal is the wage distribution. This will
increase the sin tax when it is progressive (i.e., when cov(u0 (ci) ; xi) < 0) and decrease
the tax when it is regressive (positive covariance).
The impact of a positive correlation on cov(u0 (ci) ; ei) is less clear: wealthier people
buy less sin good, but they also better realize the importance of health care, so that the
net impact on the amount of ei consumed is not easy to determine. These results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider the case of persistent errors where the policy tools are restricted
to a linear sin tax, a linear subsidy on health and a lump sum transfer. If cross derivatives
@~x=@ and @~e=@ are negligible we have the following results:
a) The expressions for the optimal levels of  and  are given by equations (21) and (22).
b) The level of the sin tax decreases as the correlation between i and wi increases (i.e.,
when wealthier individuals tend to be less myopic).
c) When cov(u0 (ci) ; xi) < 0 (resp. cov(u0 (ci) ; xi) > 0) the sin tax tends to be higher
(lower) the more unequal the wage distribution and the more concave the utility function.
IV Second-best with dual self
Now we assume that the individuals realize after one period that they made a mistake and
that the only corrective decision they can make is the choice of health expenditure. As in
section II, we thus distinguish between the planned investment ePi and the ex post choice
ei. The indirect utility function used by the social planner in its welfare maximization
has to take into account these two values of ei which yield two values of di (planned and
e¤ective).
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In the rst period, the functions xi (; ; a), si (; ; a) and ePi (; ; a) are obtained as
the solution to
  u0 (ci) + u0
 
dPi

= 0; (23)
  u0 (ci) (1 + ) + '0 (xi) + ihx
 
xi; e
P
i

= 0; (24)
  u0  dPi  (1 + ) + he  xi; ePi  = 0: (25)
where dPi = si   ePi (1 + ) > di = si   ei (1 + ).
In the second period the e¤ective demand for e is dened by
(1 + )u0(di) = he(xi; ei);
which yields ei as a function of xi and si. Substituting these variables by their expressions
in terms of (; ; a) yields
ei = f
 
si; xi; e
P
i

= ei (; ; a) : (26)
The Lagrangian is given by
L3 =
IX
i=1
ni [u(wi   si   xi (1 + ) + a) + ' (xi) + u (si   (1 + ) ei)
+h (xi; ei)   (a  xi   ei)] ;
which is similar to L2 except that individual choices are now determined by (23), (24)
and (26). The rst-order conditions for the maximization of L3 are given in Appendix B.
These can be rewritten as follows if we assume that the cross price e¤ects are negligible:
 =
1
 PIi=1 ni (@~xi=@)
"
  cov [u0 (ci) ; xi] +
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
+
IX
i=1
ni

hx (xi; ei)  ihx
 
xi; e
P
i
 @~xi
@
#
; (27)
 =
1
 PIi=1 ni (@~ei=@)
"
  cov [u0 (ci) ; ei] +
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
#
: (28)
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The expression for the optimal level of the sin tax includes three terms: an optimal tax
term that measures the redistributive impact of the sin tax, a saving compensationterm
(which accounts for the impact of the sin tax on the, otherwise insu¢ cient, level of saving)
and a Pigouvian term that corrects for the degree of myopia. The covariance term is the
same as that in the single self scenario and reects the equity concern of public policy.
The second term of the numerator in (27) has the same sign as @~s=@. The intuition
for this term goes as follows: individuals over-estimate their second period consumption
(dP > d) since they under-estimate their health care needs. As a consequence, they do
not save enough. To compensate for this, the tax will tend to be higher if it has a positive
e¤ect on saving. The third term of the numerator of (27) is the Pigouvian term found in
equation (13) summed over all individuals with weights equal to the e¤ect of the tax on
individual demands of x. With  = 0 or hxe < 0, it is positive (as long as @~x=@ < 0).
Equation (28) has a similar interpretation, except that only the rst two terms are present
(redistribution and savings compensation). There is no Pigouvian term here.14
In the case of identical individuals, (27) and (28) can be rewritten as:
 =
1


u0
 
dP
  u0 (d) @~s=@
@~x=@
+
1


(  )hx (x; e) + 

hx
 
x; eP
  hx(x; e)	 ;
 =
1


u0
 
dP
  u0 (d) @~s=@
@~e=@
:
Unlike in the case of persistent error, the rst-best can no longer be achieved with the
two considered instruments even when individuals are identical. The second part of the
sin tax is the familiar Pigouvian term, expressed as in the rst-best decentralization
equation (14). The other term in both equations comes from our inability to control
saving directly, which would be necessary to decentralize the rst-best optimum. Saving
14 Recall that we are in the case where cross price e¤ects are negligible so that  has no impact on x.
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can be indirectly controlled through the use of both  and . If any of these instruments
stimulates saving, this makes using it more desirable. These results are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider the case of dual self where the policy tools are restricted to a
linear sin tax, a linear subsidy on health and a lump sum transfer. If @~x=@ ! 0 and
@~e=@ ! 0; we have the following results:
a) The optimal tax formulas are given by equations (27) and (28).
b) Properties b) and c) of Proposition 3, remain valid in the dual self case.
c) The sin tax tends to be higher (and the health subsidy lower) the higher its impact on
savings.
So far we have assumed that savings could not be taxed. Introducing  as an extra
instrument has a signicant impact on the results only if all individuals are identical; in
that case the linear instruments are su¢ cient to implement the rst-best. However, with
heterogeneous individuals this is not true and the qualitative results are not a¤ected by
the availability of a tax (or subsidy) on savings.15 In particular, the saving compensation
term does not disappear from the expression because  does not provide a perfect control
of individual savings.
V Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the case of sin goods that have delayed negative e¤ects
that individuals ignore at the time of consumption but acknowledge later. Individuals
have then the possibility of partially compensating those negative e¤ects by investing in
15 Except that with this extra instrument, the second-best solution will be close to the rst-best outcome
when the degree of heterogeneity is small.
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health care. Assuming a paternalistic government, we show that the rst-best could be
decentralized with a sin tax, a subsidy on saving and individualized lump sum transfers
(or alternatively, by assuming identical individuals). In the second-best, individualized
lump sum transfers are not available and the only available instruments are a linear sin
tax and a linear subsidy on health care. We discuss the optimal second-best tax subsidy
policy wherein distributive and corrective Pigouvian considerations are mixed.
We also consider the case of what we call persistent error, namely the case where
individuals acknowledge the negative e¤ects of their sinful consumption when it is too
late to take any corrective action (i.e., after ei has been chosen). From an individuals
perspective this latter case is formally equivalent to yet another setting which corresponds
to what can be called persisting ignorance, where the individual never acknowledges the
negative e¤ects of his consumption.
The interaction between sin goods and health spending and its incidence on sin taxes is
at the heart of this paper. We have seen that in the rst-best the sin tax closely depends
on the cross derivative hxe. We have also shown that the impact of the possibility of
making compensatory health expenditures on the size of the sin taxes depends on this
same cross derivative. In the second best the degree of substitutability between e and x
inuences the sin tax in a more complex way. All the e¤ects described in the rst-best
remain applicable (through the Pigouvian term which depends on hxe). However, there
are now many more avenues through which the interaction a¤ects the optimal policy.
Specically, it a¤ects the compensated derivatives as well as the covariance terms. Our
results provide some general qualitative insight into these problems. To reach more
specic and quantitative conclusions, empirical studies or at least calibrated simulations
of our setting are necessary.
23
In this paper we have focused on sin goods consumption. Our method could be used
for other problems. For example, lack of physical exercises or hygiene in the rst period
of life which has delayed detrimental e¤ects. These e¤ects can be partially o¤set in the
second period. Another example is overtime or moonlighting that lead to early disability.
A fully rational individual would understand the importance of not abusing ones body
when young to avoid regretful consequences later on in lifetime. The ingredients of these
various situations are: behavior with delayed detrimental e¤ects, myopia and possibility
of partial compensation.
Appendix
A First-order conditions for the maximization of L2
Assuming interior solutions and making use of (16), (17) and (18), the FOCs of the social
problem are given by:
@L2
@a
=
IX
i=1
niu
0 (ci) +
IX
i=1
ni

hx (xi; ei)
@xi
@a
+ he (xi; ei)
@ei
@a

(   i)
  
IX
i=1
ni

1  @xi
@a
  @ei
@a

= 0;
@L2
@
= 
IX
i=1
niu
0 (ci)xi +
IX
i=1
ni

hx (xi; ei)
@xi
@
+ he (xi; ei)
@ei
@

(   i)
+ 
IX
i=1
ni

xi + 
@xi
@
+ 
@ei
@

= 0;
@L2
@
= 
IX
i=1
niu
0 (di) ei +
IX
i=1
ni

hx (xi; ei)
@xi
@
+ he (xi; ei)
@ei
@

(   i)
+ 
IX
i=1
ni

e+ 
@xi
@
+ 
@ei
@

= 0:
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B First-order conditions for the maximization of L3
The FOCs are given by
@L3
@a
=
IX
i=1
niu
0 (ci) +
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @si
@a
+
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@x
@a
  
IX
i=1
ni

1  @xi
@a
  @ei
@a

= 0;
@L3
@
= 
IX
i=1
niu
0 (ci)xi +
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @si
@
+
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@xi
@
+ 
IX
i=1
ni

xi + 
@xi
@
+ 
@ei
@

= 0;
@L3
@
= 
IX
i=1
niu
0 (di) ei +
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @si
@
+
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@xi
@
+ 
IX
i=1
ni

ei + 
@xi
@
+ 
@ei
@

= 0;
where
~Hi = hx (xi; ei)  ihx
 
xi; e
P
i

:
As in section III we use @L3=@a to obtain the compensated expressions of @L3=@
and @L3=@
@ ~L3
@
=  cov [u0 (ci) ; xi] +
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
+
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@~xi
@
+ 
IX
i=1
ni


@~xi
@
+ 
@~ei
@

= 0;
@ ~L3
@
=  cov [u0 (ci) ; ei] +
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
+
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@~xi
@
+ 
IX
i=1
ni


@~xi
@
+ 
@~ei
@

= 0:
It is clear from the above that even with identical individuals, one cannot achieve the
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rst-best with  and  as instruments. Solving for  and , we obtain
 =
1
Dds
(
cov [u0 (ci) ; xi]
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
  cov [u0 (ci) ; ei]
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
 
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@~xi
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
+
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@~xi
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
 
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
+
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
)
;
 =
1
Dds
(
cov [u0 (ci) ; ei]
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
  cov [u0 (ci) ; xi]
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
 
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@~xi
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
+
IX
i=1
ni ~Hi
@~xi
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
 
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
+
IX
i=1
ni

u0 (di)  u0
 
dPi
 @~si
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
)
;
where
Dds = 
"
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
 
IX
i=1
ni
@~ei
@
IX
i=1
ni
@~xi
@
#
:
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